We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995) . In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects' expectations about each other's behavior are also elicited. Our results show that average payback levels increase with the average amount sent. Asymmetric information does not reduce the amounts sent and returned, as compared with previous experimental studies. The first movers' choices increase with their expectations about the second movers' payback, whose choices depend in turn on the difference between expected and actual amounts received.
Introduction
An increasing body of literature in experimental economics has provided evidence of cooperative behavior in situations where noncooperation is a dominant strategy, and in which no enforcing mechanisms such as reputation concerns, repeated interactions, contractual pre-commitments, or punishment threats support a cooperative equilibrium.
In a previous investigation of the investment game, Berg et al. (1995) argued that "trust can be viewed as a behavioral primitive," and that an agent's decision to reward trust may depend on this agent's subjective interpretation of the inherent motives of the trustor. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that economic agents are evolutionarily predisposed to produce cooperative outcomes using their ability to "ratify one another's volitional states" (Hoffman et al.(1998) ). Choosing different levels of "trust" can be seen as a way to signal some kind of "cooperative predisposition," which, in turn, triggers reciprocal behavior. In the experiment reported here, our aim is to test whether trust and reciprocity survive as patterns of behavior even in a setting where individual decisions have very low informational content about any predisposition to be cooperative. This is achieved by using an asymmetric information structure in an investment game in which only the player who is in charge of dividing the surplus is aware of its true size.
The investment game is a sequential two-person game. The first mover can send any amount of his or her initial endowment to an anonymous counterpart. The amount received by the second mover equals the amount sent multiplied by a factor greater than one. The second mover can return to the first mover any amount taken from his or her initial endowment plus the amount received. Backward induction suggests that opportunistic players would not voluntarily engage in any transaction unless they expect trust and reciprocity to play a role in determining the behavior of their counterparts.
In our experiment only the trustee is aware of the size of the surplus obtained so that the trustor cannot tell if a low return corresponds to a low or high level of reciprocity. In a similar study, Güth et al. (1996) use a two-level ultimatum game and conclude that "received generosity induces own generosity," which they interpret as some sort of indirect reciprocity.
Nevertheless, reciprocal behavior in their case is confounded with the risk of being punished by a third party who has veto power. The investment game with asymmetric information, in contrast, allows us to test direct (i.e., bilateral) reciprocity when the decision to reciprocate is risk free. Additionally, we ask for subjects' expectations about the behavior of their counterparts, which allows for a better interpretation of the motives that lead to specific patterns of behavior. 1 The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe our behavioral hypotheses for the investment game with asymmetric information; Sections 3 and 4 describe the design and the procedures of our experiment; Section 5 reports the results and the analysis of the data; and Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
Theoretical and behavioral hypotheses
We modify the investment game (Berg et al. (1995) ). In our design the two players A and B have equal initial endowment ω. The value of the initial endowment is common information. In the first stage of the game, player A (the "trustor") may send any amount 0 ≤ a ≤ ω from his or her endowment to player B (the "trustee"). The amount sent is then multiplied by a stochastic factor m, which takes the value m = 2 with probability p ∈ (0, 1), or m = 4 with probability (1 − p). Only player B learns the true value of the multiplier m.
In the second stage, after observing how much surplus has been gen- We extend the definition of trust given by Coleman (1990) , we say that she or he "trusts" the second mover. In response to a trusting behavior (and if the amount received is greater than the amount expected), the second mover may return an amount greater than or equal to the amount received. This behavior could be based on reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion. Thus, we propose
If a positive payback is simply motivated by altruism, then it should not depend on the level of trust shown by A. On the other hand, reciprocity and inequality-aversion motives should cause levels of trust to be positively correlated with payback levels. Therefore, the third hypothesis concerns the type of correlation between the amounts sent and returned. The experiment proceeded as follows: First, the subjects entered the room of the experiment and were randomly seated. They read the instructions and filled out a control questionnaire. The objective of the control questionnaire was to check whether the subjects understood the instructions before proceeding with the experiment. After everybody finished reading the questionnaire, participants were requested to draw a card from a bag that contained as many cards as the number of participants in the experi-3 See Brandts and Charness (2000) and Schotter et al. (1994) for a further discussion of this topic. 4 We elicited subject's expectations using a fixed fee. Experimental evidence in eliciting subjects' expectations shows that effort and accuracy in the presence of a flat fee are comparable with the results obtained by implementing more complex procedures, such as Quadratic scoring rule (Sonnemans and Offerman, 2001 ). ment. Each card was marked with a code number that they were required to keep secret. One of the cards was marked with the word "monitor." The monitor did not actively participate in the experiment and was the only contact between the experimenters and the subjects during the proceeding of the experiment. He or she just verified that the instructions were followed, distributed the decision forms, collected them, and then supervised the monetary payment procedure. The monitor earned an amount equal to the average earnings of all the other participants. This information was provided to the monitor privately.
The decision forms of A and B participants, once collected, were randomly paired, and the payments were determined according to the amount sent by A, the amount returned by B, and the multiplier, as described above.
This was done by first choosing the multiplier randomly, and then checking for B's response to the choice made by the corresponding A. We conducted 3 sessions of the experiment with 11 subjects each (10 subjects plus a monitor). After calculating the payoffs, the experimenters put the money and a description of the calculation into the payment envelopes marked with the code numbers. The monitor then distributed the envelopes to the subjects, who privately checked if the amount was exact and left the room after signing a list with all code numbers and the corresponding payoffs. They signed that they had received money in cash under one of the code numbers printed in the list. In this way their payoff was kept anonymous.
All subjects were first-year undergraduate students at the University of York, and they had not previously participated in economics experiments.
Sessions lasted approximately one hour.
Results
The data collected consist of the amounts a that A participants want to send, the amounts b(a) that B participants want to return for each feasible value a, the A participants' expectations about the amount b(a), and the amount a that B participants expect to receive from their counterparts. The analysis of the results is divided into two parts: choice and expectations.
Choice
The results of the experiment strongly reject Hypothesis 1. Figure 1 shows that only one subject (in pair 15) sent zero to his or her counterpart, and only three subjects (in pairs 7, 12, and 14) returned zero to the first mover.
The average amount sent was 38 ECUs (with a standard deviation of 24.84); the average amount returned was 47.33 ECUs (with a standard deviation of 42.14). There is more dispersion in the amount of payback than the amount sent. This is explained in part by the fact that B can send any amount, not only multiples of 10, to A, and in part by the increase of the feasible range due to the multiplier. Figures 3 and 4 show that behavior is consistent with an equal split of the pie only if the multiplier is m = 2, but not if m = 4 (in the former case, the median payback is very close to the equal-split line, while in the latter case the median payback is clearly below that line.) Table 1 On the other hand, there is no significant difference between the expectations of payback for the two multipliers. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the distributions for m = 2 and m = 4 are the same in absolute terms (K-S =0.455, p-value=0.211). Therefore, the first movers expect a defecting behavior from the second movers, meaning that they expect the second mover to exploit their private information on the effective value of the multiplier. Table 2 reports ordered probit regression estimates of the amount sent as a function of payback expectation. Similarly, table 3 reports the ordered probit regression of the amount returned on the difference between the amount received and the amount expected from the first mover. In both tables, the estimated parameters are positive and significantly greater than zero (Hypothesis 2 is confirmed).
Expectations

Concluding remarks
The results of our experiment strongly reject the "standard" hypotheses, i.e., our data are inconsistent with the self-regarding preference model. The introduction of asymmetric information in the investment game does not reduce the amounts sent and returned when compared with a previous experimental study of the investment game (with complete information). Moreover, average payback levels increase with the average amount sent. The second movers did not fully exploit their informational advantage regarding the value of the multiplier, even though paybacks tend to fall below "equal split" of the surplus as the multiplier increases. The data on expectations show a remarkable ability of the subjects to predict other subjects' behaviors. The first movers expected an increasing amount of payback for an increasing amount of money sent. The second movers guessed (on average) correctly the amount they would receive.
Decisions and expectations in our experiment deviate from the standard model of self-regarding preference and rationality. Our experimental data are consistent with a model based on subjects' beliefs about the intentionality of the other players' actions (see Rabin, 1993) . The first movers' choices are functions of their expectations about the second movers' payback. The second movers' choices depend on the difference between the amount the first movers have sent them and their expectations about this amount.
Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish trust from other motives that may affect the first movers' sending behavior. Indeed, we can measure the amount of trust as the amount sent by a subject expecting a greater amount in payback. This procedure (eliciting payback expectation) 5 solves the critique raised by Cox (2001) 6 about the impossibility of distinguishing between trust and altruism as determinants of the first movers' behavior in the investment game of Berg et al. 5 The first mover has to express his or her expectation about the amount the second mover will return for any amount he or she might send. 6 Cox (2001) introduced a "triadic" design in order to distinguish between different motives of reciprocal behavior.
